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Abstract: We extend Boyer and Petersen’s model of Folk Economic Beliefs (FEBs) by 
suggesting they serve self-interest (broadly defined), which includes indirect benefits like 
creating alliances, advancing self-beneficial ideologies, and signaling one’s traits. By expanding 
the definition of self-interest, the model can predict who will hold what FEBs, which FEBs will 
propagate, when they will change, why, and in which direction.  












Boyer and Petersen present an excellent model arguing that folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) are a 
product of automatic inference systems which evolved in ancestral small-scale societies. 
However, their model is currently unclear: are FEBs only (mis)applications of social exchange 
heuristics into the evolutionarily novel domain of macroeconomics, or are they self-interested 
under a broader concept of self-interest? Here we supplement their model by expanding the 
definition of self-interest to include indirect benefits, and advance novel specific predictions 
about who will hold which FEBs, and when. 
 
In the target article, the definition of self-interest is limited to direct material benefits and 
excludes implicitly self-interested actions, such as signaling (Higham, 2014), competitive 
altruism (Barclay & Willer, 2007), conformity (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004), and helping allies 
(Weeden & Kurzban, 2014). This limits the predictive power of the model by making it too 
general to predict which FEBs each individual will hold. Moreover, the model also misses the 
opportunity to use self-interest to predict why certain FEBs prevail over others.  
 
We propose that FEBs will not only map onto the existing social exchange mechanisms, but also 
reflect the interests of the individual. Specifically, we predict that individuals will hold FEBs that 
are aligned with their perceived interests - broadly defined - and will promote FEBs that (a) 
create beneficial alliances (see DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013) or signal one’s group membership (as 
discussed in the target article), (b) increase one’s competitiveness in a biological market, where 
individuals differ in “partner quality” and compete for access to desirable partners (see Barclay, 
2013, 2016), and (c) benefit a large or influential group of people.  
 
People hold beliefs and act in ways they perceive will benefit themselves (see DeScioli et al., 
2014; Petersen et al., 2013), which can vary according to circumstances (DeScioli et al., 2014; 
Petersen et al., 2014; self-serving justifications: Shalvi et al., 2015; error management theory: 
Haselton & Galperin, 2012). Longitudinal studies show that redistributive preferences (e.g., 
“government should reduce income disparity”) change when individuals face difficult times, 
such as unemployment, in the direction aligned with their interest (DeScioli et al., 2014; Owens 
& Pedulla, 2014; Naumann, Buss, & Bähr, 2015). Moreover, the perceived benefits may not 
accurately map onto actual benefits, especially when individuals are manipulated by others. We 
propose that FEBs function in a similar way, and vary according to perceived benefits and costs, 
thus leading to an occasional mismatch between one’s interest as predicted by macroeconomics 
and one’s FEB.  
 
Some FEBs can have significant coalitional value, and will be expressed most often to 
individuals with similar interests in order to make alliances and promote changes (or the status 
quo) based on shared, mutually favorable goals. Championing a FEB can rally alliances, 
coordinate condemnation of undesirable behaviors, and convince others to act in a way 
consistent with one’s own interests. As in moral condemnation (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013), 
publicly signaling support for an FEB can promote bystanders to take sides. For example, 
individuals who perceive they will be harmed by markets will favor the “markets are bad” FEB, 
and the “price regulation has the intended effect” belief will be held by those unable to compete 
in unregulated markets and consequently benefit the most from price regulations. Moreover, 
believing that “immigrants steal jobs” will be more likely when one is unsuccessfully competing 
for the same type of jobs, and the “labor as the source of value” FEB should be held most often 
by those for whom labor is the primary source of income (e.g. those in low-paying, high 
demanding jobs).  
 
In terms of partner choice and biological markets, individuals should promote their interests by 
selectively adopting FEBs which enhance their market value or advertise desirable traits, while 
rejecting FEBs that decrease their market value. By analogy, individuals’ Big Five personality 
traits are correlated with their values - one’s values (and beliefs) can be used to justify or extol 
one’s traits (Roccas et al., 2002). With FEBs, the “immigrants steal jobs” FEB should be least 
common among individuals who want to signal their competitiveness on the job market, the 
“profit motive is detrimental” FEB should be most common in contexts where it is beneficial for 
people to be perceived as prosocial or genuinely concerned for others’ welfare, as it will increase 
their value as a partner (e.g., Barclay, 2013), and the “social welfare programs are abused by 
scroungers” FEB should be most prevalent among job-holders that want to signal that they are 
hard workers. Furthermore, which FEBs are expressed should depend on who the audience is and 
what their interests are, e.g., the “immigrants steal jobs” or the “immigrants abuse welfare” FEBs 
should be experienced less often when on a date with an attractive immigrant; the “labor as the 
source of value” FEB should be expressed more often when befriending a laborer, and 
“international trade has negative effects” FEB is more likely to be imparted in the company of 
fellow patriots.  
 
Why do some beliefs become FEBs, while others do not? Those that take hold are likely 
beneficial for the individual and beneficial to a large or influential group who propagate it, 
because they also perceive that belief to benefit them. For example, if only a small group of low-
status laborers thought "labor is the source of value", it wouldn't become a widely held FEB even 
if it maps onto social exchange mechanisms. Beliefs will only become FEBs if there are 
interested parties to champion them and interested audiences to propagate them. 
 
In this comment, we add to Boyer & Petersen’s model and make predictions about which FEBs 
individuals will support based on their perceived interests and their audience. If FEBs were 
solely a reflection of social exchange heuristics, we wouldn’t expect them to systematically vary 
in these ways. This view is consistent with the characteristics of FEBs listed by the authors, such 
that they are unstable and can change rapidly, between and within individuals. Furthermore, we 
predict which FEBs will propagate, when they will change, why, and in which direction: towards 
self-interest, broadly defined. 
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